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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, I 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 900545 
v, t 
THAYNE LARRY WALKER, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant.: 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of aggravated robbery, 
a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 
(1990). This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The issues presented in this appeal are: 
1. Has defendant preserved for appellate review his 
claim that the trial court erred in ruling that two of his prior 
felony convictions were admissible under rule 609, Utah Rules of 
Evidence? A defendant must testify at trial to preserve for 
appellate review a claim of improper impeachment with a prior 
conviction. State v> Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1036 (Utah 1987). 
2. Since there was no ruling on the reliability of 
eyewitness identification evidence prior to its admission at 
trial, are the circumstances surrounding the eyewitness 
identifications so undisputed and clear that the only reasonable 
assumption is that the trial court found the facts in accordance 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
( 
with its decision to admit the evidence? Even when a trial court 
fails to enter requisite factual findings to reach any necessary 
legal conclusions, an appellate court will uphold the lower court 
ruling "whenever it would be reasonable to assume that the court 
actually made such findings" based on the competent evidence in 
the record. State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 787-88 n.6 (Utah 
1991). "If the ambiguity of the facts makes this assumption 
unreasonable, however, [the appellate court should] remand for a 
new trial." Id,, at 788. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The text of any constitutional provisions, statutes and 
rules applicable to a determination of this case are set forth in 
the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 18, 1989, defendant was charged with 
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1990) (R. 6-7). Subsequently, an amended 
information was filed which additionally charged defendant with 
being a habitual criminal, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
1001 (1990) (R. 30-31). 
Defendant filed three pretrial motions to suppress 
various eyewitnesses' identifications (R. 19, 32-38, 49-50). The 
motions were denied (R. 18, 51). Defendant also filed a pretrial 
motion to suppress introduction of any of his prior convictions 
(R. 22, 62-64, 83-88). The motion was granted as to three prior 
convictions but denied on two felony convictions (R. 44, 98). 
• - : 2 • • - • • 
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From July 7 through 12, 1990, a jury trial on the 
aggravated robbery charge was held before the Honorable Scott 
Daniels, Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah 
(R. 98-104). A guilty verdict was returned as charged (R. 104). 
In a separate proceeding on July 16, 1990, defendant was found to 
be a habitual criminal (R. 217). On October 5, 1990, defendant 
was sentenced to the statutory term of five years to life in the 
Utah State Prison on the aggravated robbery conviction, the 
habitual criminal sentence was merged with that of the robbery, 
and a one year consecutive sentence was imposed under the firearm 
enhancement provision, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1990) (R. 235, 
243-45, 247-48). Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal (R. 
251). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On August 18, 1989, a lone masked gunman robbed a Taco 
Bell of $800.00 dollars (T. 16-29).l After entering the fast 
food restaurant, the gunman jumped the customer counter and said, 
"This is a stick up" (T. 21, 187). The robber motioned Trista 
Valdez, an employee, to the safe, grabbed a money bag in it, and 
stated, "I will take this" (T. 20-21, 146, 188, 190). The robber 
then motioned Ms. Valdez to the cash registers and removed more 
1
 The various volumes of transcripts are not numbered 
consistently in this case. While some of the volumes use an 
initial record cite with internal pages having a transcript cite, 
other volumes use record cites for each page of transcript. Since 
the transcripts of the trial use initial record cites but the 
internal pages are numbered consecutively, any references to the 
trial transcripts will simply be as (T. — ) , using the consecutive 
page numbers. Cites to other volumes will use the record cites as 
designated. 
3 
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i 
money (T. 25-29, 146-48). The robber told the employees, "Don't 
even try anything or I will kill you" (T. 26, 89, 144, 189). The 
robber then jumped back over the counter and left Taco Bell (T. 
29-30, 90). 
Two women sitting in a car across from Taco Bell saw 
the robber emerge from the restaurant at the same time that they 
heard a robbery had occurred (T. 225-27). As the robber 
continued walking down the street, the women followed in their 
vehicle. They could not see the robber's face but did see him 
get into the passenger side of a light blue Datsun or Toyota 
automobile parked in a field about a block from Taco Bell (T. 
228-230). They observed the license plate of the vehicle and 
reported the number to the police (T. 231). 
Subsequent investigation of the license plate number 
determined that it matched a blue Toyota registered to Thomas 
Bridwell, but used by his daughter, Linda Bridwell Rice, a friend 
of defendant (T. 259, 267-68, 303, 310). 
Within minutes of the robbery, the police arrived at 
Taco Bell (T. 170). Four employees, Trista Valdez, Randy Orvin, 
Lance Ewing, and Jerod Stern, described the robber as a male, in 
his late 20's or early 30's, between 6'1" to 6'4" feet tall, 
weighing between 165 and 170 pounds, with light brown or 
brownish-blond long hair, light blue eyes, and with very wrinkled 
skin surrounding his eyes (T. 20, 87-88, 148, 150, 191-93). 
Because the robber wore a ski mask, they could not see his face 
except for the eyes and a little of the mouth (T. 21, 86, 149, 
4 
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163, 192). Little pieces of a mustache were discernable around 
the mouth (T. 70-71, 86, 148). When the robber spoke, his voice 
was deep and gruff (T. 37). The witnesses agreed that the 
robbery had occurred "pretty quick," lasting no more than five 
minutes and possibly less than three minutes (T. 59, 169, 179, 
190, 192, 195). 
Approximately one week after the robbery, a photo 
spread was separately shown to the four employees (T. 266). 
While the photo spread contained six photographs of different 
men, only defendant and one other individual pictured had blue 
eyes (T. 265-66; Exhibit 15). Based on the eye color, the 
witnesses subsequently testified that they only considered these 
two pictures (T. 52-53, 107, 200-01). None of the witnesses made 
a positive identification but they did identify defendant and the 
other blue-eyed individual as being similar to the robber (T. 38-
40, 96, 156-57, 198-99). 
On September 15, 1989, a formal lineup was held (R. 
263; Exhibit 8). Defendant appeared with six other individuals. 
All were masked and directed to repeat some of the phrases used 
during the robbery (R. 263 at 2, 4). None of the Taco Bell 
employees positively identified defendant. However, Stern, 
Orvin, and Ewing identified defendant as possibly being the 
robber, while Valdez tentatively identified another individual 
(R. 263 at 13-14; T. 41-44, 97-99, 157-59, 202-04). 
Prior to the preliminary hearing in December 1989, a 
second lineup was conducted at defendant's request (R. 294-95). 
5 
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i 
Defendant appeared in the December lineup with six individuals 
different than those participating in the September lineup. The \ 
lineup was two-fold: first, the men appeared masked and spoke 
phrases; second, they appeared unmasked and were silent (R. 319-
20, 322, 323-24). When the men appeared masked, Stern , 
tentatively identified defendant as the robber, Valdez 
tentatively identified another individual, and Ewing made no 
identification. When the men then appeared unmasked, Stern 
positively identified defendant, Valdez tentatively identified 
defendant, and Ewing continued to identify no one (R. 333, 336; 
T. 44-47, 161-63, 204-06).2 
Prior to trial, defendant filed three motions to 
suppress the out-of-court identifications and to restrict any in-
court identifications of defendant (R. 19, 32-38, 49-50). Among 
other issues, defendant argued that the photo spread and lineups 
were conducted in a suggestive manner and that the witnesses had 
no basis from which to make an unmasked identification (R. 32, 
49-50, 271, 280). Neither defendant nor the State presented any 
facts surrounding the actual identifications, instead focusing on 
the procedures utilized in conducting the lineups (R. 264, 304). 
The trial court denied the motions (R. 18, 51). 
At trial, Ewing, Stern, and Orvin positively identified 
defendant as the robber (T. 91-92, 154, 197). 
Aside from the identifications, an immunized witness, 
2
 Orvin was not available to participate in the December 
lineup (T. 99). 
6 
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Toni Christenson, testified that in mid-August 1989, defendant 
and Linda Bridwell Rice asked her to secure a gun for them so 
that they could "make some money" (T. 303, 305-06, 309). 
Christenson took a gun from her father's home and gave it to 
defendant (T. 310-311, 313). A few nights later, defendant and 
Rice came over to an apartment where Christenson was and said 
that they had been "making money" (T. 313-317). Defendant had 
the gun and a money bag containing coins in Taco Bell wrappers 
(T. 315, 320-22). On cross-examination, it was established that 
Christenson was related to Rice but had disputes with her and 
"wanted to get her in trouble," to "set up Linda" (T. 325-330, 
337). For this reason and because she wanted to "clear up" her 
criminal record, Christenson related these incidents to the 
police in April 1990, approximately eight months after the 
robbery (T. 330-32, 343). Christenson was unsure of when she 
secured the gun for defendant since she was drinking extensively 
and using other drugs, including Soma, hycodaphen, heroin and 
downers (T. 334-337).3 
Defendant did not testify on his own behalf but did 
present an alibi witness (T. 421-32; R. 268 at 3-4). The jury 
returned a guilty verdict on aggravated robbery (R. 214). 
3
 Other evidence established that the owner of the gun 
reported it stolen in mid-August 1989. 
7 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Pretrial, the court ruled that if defendant testified, 
two of his prior felony convictions would be admissible to 
impeach his credibility pursuant to rule 609, Utah Rules of 
Evidence, During trial, defendant was advised that case law 
required him to testify in order to preserve his appellate 
challenge to the court's ruling. Defendant did not testify and 
has, therefore, waived any challenge to the pretrial ruling. 
No pretrial ruling was made on the reliability, and 
hence, constitutional admissibility, of the eyewitness 
identifications of defendant. Since the record on appeal is 
inadequate to support the conclusion that the trial court would 
have necessarily found facts only in support of admissibility, 
the case should be remanded for a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO PRESERVE FOR PURPOSES 
OF APPELLATE REVIEW ANY CHALLENGE TO THE 
TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT TWO OF HIS 
PRIOR FELONY CONVICTIONS WERE ADMISSIBLE 
UNDER RULE 609, UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE. 
In Points I and IA of his brief, defendant argues that 
the trial court erroneously concluded that two of defendant's 
prior felony convictions were admissible for purposes of 
impeachment pursuant to rule 609, Utah Rules of Evidence, and 
that this Court should consider the merits of defendant's claim 
despite his failure to testify at trial. Specifically, defendant 
acknowledges that Utah law requires him to testify to preserve a 
8 
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challenge under rule 609 (Br. of App. at 11). See State v. 
Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1036 (Utah 1987); State v. Banner, 717 
P.2d 1325, 1331 (Utah 1986). Yet, defendant asserts that he 
should be exempted from this mandate because of "a combination of 
inaccurate advice by both his counsel and the trial judge" (Br. 
of App. at 11). Defendant's argument lacks legal and factual 
support. 
Defendant presented several witnesses on his behalf at 
trial (T.373, 383, 386, 421). At the close of the defense case, 
the court inquired of counsel if she had any more witnesses to 
present (R. 268 at 1-4). In response, defendant's counsel 
replied: 
I don't believe we do, your honor. And I 
should indicate that Mr. Donaldson and I and 
Thayne [defendant] have talked at length 
about his right to testify and indicated to 
him that he has an absolute right to testify. 
We both advise him not to testify based upon 
what's come in and what we have argued. And 
I believe he's willing to accept and follow 
that advice. He certainly was concerned 
about testifying to preserve the 609 issue. 
And that's a concern of ours as well, but I 
think that given your ruling on the 609 issue 
that would be very, very risky. 
(R. 268 at 3). The court directly questioned defendant 
concerning his decision not to testify which defendant affirmed 
(R. 268 at 4). The following exchange then occurred: 
[THE COURT]: Now, I understand, and I guess 
the record should clearly reflect, that one 
of the reasons that you've made that decision 
is because of my ruling on the question of 
whether prior convictions could be brought 
up. And your attorneys, of course, have 
objected to my ruling on that and established 
on the record at considerable length, and 
9 
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also in a motion to reconsider, that you 
object to that. And I understand that your 
decision is based, in part, on that ruling 
and that's preserved for appeal. 
Does that sufficiently cover that, 
Ms. Bowman? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I guess I should add, 
it's our opinion that the case law would 
probably require him to testify to be able to 
appeal that. The name of the case is 
escaping me at the moment, but that's how we 
talked to him about that issue. And they've 
been wrong on that, but we don't know — but 
that's what we believe. 
[THE COURT]: You've discussed that with him 
and based upon all the factors and based upon 
the advice of your attorneys you decide not 
to testify, is that right, Mr. Walker? 
[DEFENDANT]: That's right. 
(R. 268 at 4). The record does not support defendant's claim 
that he was so substantially misadvised as to the law that he 
failed to knowingly and intelligently waive his right to testify 
(Br. of App. at 13). 
Further, neither Gentry nor Banner requires that a 
defendant be advised on the record that he must testify to 
preserve a rule 609 challenge. Instead, beginning with Banner in 
1986 and culminating with Gentry in 1987, this Court has 
explicitly announced "for the guidance of trial courts, 
defendants, and defense counsel, the following rule: To preserve 
for appellate review a claim of improper impeachment with a prior 
conviction, a defendant must testify." Gentry. 1^1 P.2d at 1036. 
Having failed to testify, defendant has waived any 
challenge to the court's rule 609 determination. 
10 
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POINT II 
SINCE THERE WAS NO RULING ON THE RELIABILITY 
OF THE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS PRIOR TO 
THEIR ADMISSION AT TRIAL AND THE RECORD ON 
APPEAL CONTAINS CONFLICTING EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT THE RELIABILITY OF THE 
IDENTIFICATIONS, NO PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF 
ADMISSIBILITY ARISES AND THE CASE SHOULD BE 
REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
Prior to trial, defendant filed three motions to 
suppress the various eyewitness identifications made of him in 
the photo spread, the two lineups and the preliminary hearing (R. 
19, 32-38, 49-50). Additionally, defendant moved to prohibit any 
in-court identification of him at trial (R. 49-50). While the 
motions involved multiple grounds, two reasons advanced for 
suppression were: 1) the August photo spread and unmasked portion 
of the December lineup were unduly suggestive; and 2) the 
witnesses had an insufficient basis of knowledge from which to 
make an identification (R. 32-38, 271, 273, 280-81). 
Argument on the motions was held during two hearings 
(R. 269, 304). In the first hearing on February 16, 1990, 
defendant argued: 1) that during the September lineup, reference 
was incorrectly made to the robbery as occurring on August 8th 
instead of August 18th (R. 305-06, 312); and 2) that defendant's 
attorney had mistakenly placed defendant in what counsel 
characterized as the same position in the September lineup as in 
the August photo spread (R. 307-10, 312). The court ruled that 
the transcript reference to August 8th was a clerical error and 
that since the witnesses had only been involved in one robbery, 
the witnesses would not have been confused by any error in the 
11 
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date (R. 306-07, 312A). Regarding the positioning claimf the 
court found that it did not render the lineup unreliable but 
could be brought out at trial for purposes of the weight to be 
accorded the identifications (R. 312A). 
On May 22, 1990, a second hearing on the motions to 
suppress was held (R. 269). Defendant argued: 1) that all the 
out-of-court identifications should be suppressed because the 
initial photo spread was suggestive (R. 271); 2) that since the 
witnesses never saw the robber unmasked, it was suggestive to 
have the December lineup participants appear unmasked especially 
in light of the prior photo spread (R. 273); 3) that the photo 
spread and lineups were suggestive because the physical 
characteristics of the persons used were allegedly dissimilar to 
the robber's descriptions (R. 273-75); 4) that defendant was the 
only common person to the photo spread and subsequent lineups 
such that the photo spread tainted the subsequent identifications 
(R. 280); and 5) that the eyewitnesses did not have an 
independent basis to recall or identify the robber (R. 280). The 
court commented that in the prior suppression hearing he had 
ruled on the suggestiveness of the photo spread and the first 
lineup and, therefore, queried that if the first identifications 
were not contaminated, why would the subsequent identifications 
be (R. 272).A The court then ruled that the issues now raised 
A
 While the court and the parties apparently thought that the 
February hearing had involved a determination on the suggestiveness 
of the photo spread, no such ruling was made. Instead, as noted 
above, the only rulings involved the positioning claim and the 
clerical error in the date of the robbery (R. 312A). 
12 
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went to the weight to be accorded the identifications and not 
their admissibility (R. 281). Concluding that there were no due 
process violations in the second lineup, the court denied the 
motions to suppress (R. 279-81). No formal findings of fact or 
conclusions of law were entered. 
Throughout the hearings on the motions to suppress, no 
evidence was presented concerning the circumstances surrounding 
the witnesses' original observations of the robber nor their 
subsequent identifications of defendant. As such, there was no 
pretrial basis from which the court could analyze the requisite 
factors for a determination of the constitutional admissibility 
of the eyewitness identifications. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 
774, 778-779 (Utah 1991) (state due process requires a pretrial 
determination of the reliability of eyewitness identification for 
it to be constitutionally admissible); Neil v. Biqqers, 409 U.S. 
188, 198-99 (1972) (federal due process requires a determination 
of the reliability of eyewitness identification for it to be 
admissible).5 
Despite the lack of requisite factual findings, this 
Court has recognized that a trial court's ruling on the 
admissibility of evidence may still be affirmed "whenever it 
would be reasonable to assume that the court actually made such 
5
 The trial in this matter was in 1989 prior to this Court's 
decision in State v. Ramirez. However, the state constitutional 
issue was raised by defendant on appeal. Since no determinations 
of reliability and constitutional admissibility were made, the 
State's argument is the same under either the then-existing Neil v. 
Biqqers standard or the current Ramirez standard. 
13 
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findings" based on the competent evidence in the record as a 
whole. State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 787-88 n.6. "If the < 
ambiguity of the facts makes this assumption unreasonable, 
however, [the appellate court will] remand for a new trial." Id. 
at 788. 
Here, facts surrounding the identifications were 
discussed at trial. The four eyewitnesses, Stern, Ewing, Orvin, 
and Valdez, give descriptions of the robber which were consistent 
with each other and consistent with defendant's physical 
characteristics (T. 20, 87-88, 148, 150, 191-193). The witnesses 
testified that two of the pictures in the August photo spread, 
one of which was defendant, were similar to their descriptions of 
the robber, but no positive identifications were made (T. 38-40, 
52-53, 96, 107, 156-57, 198-99, 200-01). In the September 
lineup, after observing the masked participants and hearing their 
voices, Stern, Ewing, and Orvin identified defendant as possibly 
being the robber and Valdez identified another individual as 
possibly being the perpetrator (R. 263 at 13-14; T. 41-44, 97-99, 
157-59, 202-04). In the December lineup, after observing 
different masked participants and hearing their voices, Stern 
identified defendant as possibly being the robber, Valdez 
identified another individual, and Ewing identified no one. 
During the second half of the same lineup when the participants 
appeared unmasked and silent, Stern positively identified 
defendant as the robber, Valdez identified defendant as possibly 
being the robber, and Ewing could identify no one (R. 333, 336; 
14 
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T. 44-47, 161-63, 204-06). The witnesses remembered seeing 
defendant's face in the photo spread but asserted that they were 
independently making the identifications during the unmasked 
portion of the second lineup (T. 64-66, 220-21). The day after 
the second lineup, the witnesses observed defendant at the 
preliminary hearing (R. 8-9, 208-09). At trial, Valdez was not 
asked to identify defendant while Stern, Ewing and Orvin 
positively identified defendant (T. 67, 91-92, 154, 197). 
In contradiction to this testimony, the defense 
presented an eyewitness identification expert who testified that 
in his opinion, these witnesses were not able to discern a 
sufficient pattern of features from observing the masked robber's 
face to make a reliable identification (T. 391-93, 405). 
Additionally, he testified that the photo spread had an 
"effective size" of two, since four of the pictures did not match 
the descriptions of eye color given by the witnesses (T. 397-99). 
Based on the circumstances surrounding the robbery, the expert 
stated that there was less than a five percent probability that 
the witnesses could make an identification (T. 402). However, he 
could not state with certainty that the eyewitnesses were wrong 
in claiming that they could make an identification (T. 415-16). 
Taken as a whole, the facts in the record are neither 
"clear, uncontroverted, [nor] capable of supporting only a 
finding in favor" of admissibility. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 787-88 
n.6. Under either the federal or state constitutional standard, 
any post-trial determination of the facts in support of 
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admissibility is curtailed by the ambiguities surrounding the 
facts. For this reason and because defendant is entitled to a 
pretrial determination of the constitutional admissibility of any 
eyewitness testimony, the State agrees with defendant that the 
proper course is to reverse defendant's conviction and remand 
this case for retrial. Accord Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 788. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction 
should be reversed and the case remanded for retrial. 
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